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| Registros recuperados: 24 | |
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| Bastian, Christopher T.; Nagler, Amy M.; Menkhaus, Dale J.; Ehmke, Mariah D.; Whitaker, James B.; Young, C. Edwin. |
| We use laboratory market experiments to assess the impact of asymmetric knowledge of a per-unit subsidy and the effect of a decoupled annual income subsidy on factor market outcomes. Results indicate that when the subsidy is tied to the factor as a per-unit subsidy, regardless of full or asymmetric knowledge for market participants, subsidized factor buyers distribute nearly 22 percent of the subsidy to factor sellers. When the subsidy is fully decoupled from the factor, as is the case with the annual payment, payment incidence is mitigated and prices are not statistically different from the no-policy treatment. |
| Tipo: Conference Paper or Presentation |
Palavras-chave: Laboratory market experiments; Agricultural subsidies; Subsidy incidence; Land market; Ex ante policy analysis; Agricultural and Food Policy; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Q18; D03; C92. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/104108 |
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| Spraggon, John M.. |
| This paper tests the ability of an exogenous targeting instrument to induce compliance when the principal cannot observe the actions of individual agents. A number of papers show that although these instruments are able to induce groups to the target outcome, they are not able to induce individuals to make socially optimal decisions in a number of different controlled laboratory experiments. This study investigates whether the information individuals have about others’ payoffs affects how they make their decisions in this environment. Ledyard (1995) suggests that when subjects have less information in public goods experiments they are more likely to choose the Nash equilibrium decision. However, as he points out, this effect differs between groups with... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Moral Hazard in Groups; Exogenous Targeting Instruments; Experiments; Information; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C72; C92; D70. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/7383 |
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| Ule, Aljaz; Goeree, Jacob K.; Riedl, Arno. |
| This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment on network formation among heterogeneous agents. The experimental design extends the Bala-Goyal (2000) model of network formation with decay and two-way flow of benefits by allowing for agents with lower linking costs or higher benefits to others. Furthermore, agents' types may be common knowledge or private information. In all treatments, the (efficient) equilibrium network has a "star" structure. With homogeneous agents, equilibrium predictions fail completely. In contrast, with heterogeneous agents stars frequently occur, often with the high-value or low-cost agent in the center. Stars are not born but rather develop: with a high-value agent, the network's centrality, stability, and efficiency all... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Network Formation; Experiment; Heterogeneity; Private Information; Institutional and Behavioral Economics; C72; C92; D82; D85. |
| Ano: 2007 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/9099 |
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| Ligon, Ethan; Schechter, Laura. |
| What motivates people in rural villages to share? We first elicit a baseline level of sharing using a standard, anonymous dictator game. Then using variants of the dictator game that allow for either revealing the dictator's identity or allowing the dictator to choose the recipient, we attribute variation in sharing to three different motives. The first of these, directed altruism, is related to preferences, while the remaining two are incentive-related (sanctions and reciprocity). We observe high average levels of sharing in our baseline treatment, while variation across individuals depends importantly on the incentive-related motives. Finally, variation in measured reciprocity within the experiment predicts observed `real-world' gift-giving, while... |
| Tipo: Working Paper |
Palavras-chave: Community/Rural/Urban Development; Political Economy; Teaching/Communication/Extension/Profession; C92; C93; D03; D64; D85; O17. |
| Ano: 2011 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/120376 |
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| Hudson, Darren. |
| The roots and uses of economic experiments in problem solving and hypothesis testing are explored in the present article. The literature suggests that the primary advantage of economics experiments is the ability to use controlled stimuli to test economic hypotheses. Other literature also suggests that experiments are useful in problem solving settings. The advantages and disadvantages of experiments are discussed. |
| Tipo: Journal Article |
Palavras-chave: Experiments; Problem solving; Hypothesis testing; C81; C91; C92; C93. |
| Ano: 2003 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/43209 |
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| Messer, Kent D.; Poe, Gregory L.; Rondeau, Daniel; Schulze, William D.; Vossler, Christian A.. |
| Public referenda are frequently used to determine the provision of public goods. As public programs have distributional consequences, a compelling question is what role if any social preferences have on voting behavior. This paper explores this issue using laboratory experiments wherein voting outcomes lead to a known distribution of net benefits across participants. Preferences are elicited using a novel Random Price Voting Mechanism (RPVM), which is a more parsimonious mechanism than dichotomous choice referenda, but gives consistent results. Results suggest that social preferences, in particular a social efficiency motive, lead to economically meaningful deviations from self-interested voting choices and increase the likelihood that welfare-enhancing... |
| Tipo: Working or Discussion Paper |
Palavras-chave: Institutional and Behavioral Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods; C91; C92; D64; D72; H41. |
| Ano: 2008 |
URL: http://purl.umn.edu/51132 |
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| Registros recuperados: 24 | |
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